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data to evaluate this impression, we argue that it is likely to be true in part due to the top-down nature of
Swedish policies aimed at commercializing these innovations as well as an academic environment that
discourages academics from actively participating in the commercialization of their ideas. This sits in stark
contrast to a US institutional setting characterized by competition between universities for research funds
and research personnel, which in turn has led to significant academic freedoms to interact with industry,
including significant involvement in new firms.
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Today, the commercialization of university-generated knowledge looms large in the
public discussion. This is natural given the recent scientification of technology in key
industries. Since a large share of the production of scientific results takes place at
universities, the interface between universities and industry has come into focus.
Policymakers in many developed countries have responded by erecting extensive
infrastructures intended to facilitate the commercialization of scientific research output.
This paper identifies two central strategies, and the incentive structures that they create.
We then consider which set of policies are most effective. Following Nelson and
Rosenberg’s (1993) methodology for comparing national innovation systems, we compare
subsets of the U.S. and Swedish innovation systems that affect the commercialization of
university technology. As this methodology does not provide a means to evaluate the
efficiency of different national policies, our study is highly exploratory and our
conclusions only suggestive. However, this caveat does not make such studies less urgent.
In this study we will evaluate two national policies towards the commercialization of
university intellectual property, namely, the United States and Sweden. The U.S. model is
very much focused on creating (economic) incentives for universities to commercialize
their research output and then allowing them to experiment to find the best means by
which to do that. In contrast, the Swedish model, which is similar to most European
Union countries' models in some respects, is very much an attempt by the government to
directly create mechanisms that facilitate commercialization. Indeed, our findings are
echoed in the results of parallel research conducted by Gittelman (2002), who reaches
conclusions similar to our own.
Measured by per-capita publication measures, Sweden is an academic powerhouse. In
some subfields this translates into significant amounts of academic output on absolute
levels as well. Because of data constraints, it is difficult to detect transfer of university
inventions in Sweden. Although it is unclear if this reflects a lack of transfer in general or
simply a data problem, it is evident that Sweden’s transfer performance through one
mechanism, the small start-up firm, is weak. An important clue to this puzzle comes from
a growing body of evidence that the role of academics in commercializing their
discoveries is critical. This paper compares the different incentive structures that academic
researchers face in the United States and Sweden and demonstrates that in Sweden2
academics face strong disincentives to take the time away from their academic pursuits to
facilitate knowledge transfer to the commercial sector. This problem is likely to be
especially important when the optimal mode of transfer is through new start-up firms. We
do not claim that there is conclusive evidence that the Swedish technology transfer
programs are a failure. However, in light of our analysis we believe that it is unlikely that
Sweden is harvesting the full commercial potential of its research output as successfully
as the U.S.
Surprisingly, we find suggestive evidence that the American university system, whereby
intellectual property is commonly awarded to universities, is more effective in facilitating
the commercialization than the Swedish system in which rights are awarded directly to the
inventor. That is, in order to understand the incentives created by intellectual property
rights, it is imperative to understand the larger institutional context.
It is important at this early stage to define the domain of our analysis. There are a plethora
of mechanisms for technology transfer (Sandelin, 2001). Graduate students regularly carry
knowledge from the Ivory Tower into other sectors. Publications and conferences permit
industry to monitor and exploit new knowledge produced at universities. Faculty
consulting leads directly to the transfer of knowledge. Whereas visiting scholars have long
allowed academics from different institutions to exchange knowledge, more recent
constructs such as industry affiliate programs, research collaborations and
interdisciplinary research centers have brought industry representatives onto campus for
similar purposes. Technology licensing is a mechanism that has expanded greatly in the
US since the Bayh-Dole act of 1980. The analysis of all these mechanisms is well beyond
the scope of this study. Instead, this analysis will focus on these mechanisms insofar as
they facilitate the transfer of novel ideas over which intellectual property rights can be
established.
A further qualification is perhaps in order. In the exercise that follows, we attempt to
establish that Sweden, a country with half the population of Greater Los Angeles, is
unsuccessful in commercializing university technology due to an incorrect incentive
structure. We do this by comparing its relative performance with that of the United States.
One might expect that a country so small cannot reasonably be expected to produce
enough commercially valuable knowledge to have any substantial commercialization3
activity simply because the supply of ideas may be too low. We cannot directly evaluate
the strength of this claim because it is unknown at what levels of academic output, as
measured by publications, one might expect to see substantial levels of commercialization
activity, even if we could agree on exactly what is meant by substantial. To deal with this
challenge, we offer some evidence that academic output in commercially relevant fields
such as biotechnology is large, even on an absolute scale. Second, as we argue below, we
feel that it is likely that by correcting its incentives, Sweden could be reasonably expected
to improve its performance in commercialization.
Recent surveys of Technology Licensing Offices (TLOs) in U.S. universities have
revealed an important finding in the American experience that may be directly relevant to
the modest Swedish achievements in technology transfer: commercialization of university
ideas generally requires the continuing involvement of academic inventors (Jensen and
Thursby, 2001). In the U.S., the competitive nature of the university environment, along
with legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act, which gave universities title to innovations
that took place inside their walls, have caused universities to adopt policies to encourage,
or at least to permit, the continuing involvement of academic researchers, thus facilitating
the transfer of ideas to the private sector.
The Swedish experience is quite different. The Swedish government has invested lavishly
in university research that has, in turn, produced impressive academic results. At the same
time, it has enacted an extensive set of policies to facilitate the transfer of these results to
the commercial sector. Unfortunately, this effort has largely failed to create incentives for
academics to remain involved in the commercialization of their ideas. Not only have
Swedish academics historically faced limited potential upside gains to entrepreneurial
ventures, but the policies have not succeeded in limiting the downside risks vis-à-vis the
inventors’ academic careers. A key problem has been the failure to provide universities
with incentives to encourage commercialization of academics’ ideas.
It should be understood that we are not recommending, in what follows, that Swedish
universities treat American arrangements as a role model, especially insofar as that model
implies the suppression of some traditional academic norms. Rather, we invoke the
American experience for the insights that it may provide for Sweden’s achievements in
transferring technology from its universities into various sectors of the economy. We also4
believe that there are many similarities between the Swedish university system and those
of continental Europe, inasmuch as their universities are essentially parts of larger
national bureaucracies and therefore compete with one another to only a rather modest
degree. We suggest, then, that the conclusions that we draw from our analysis may also be
applicable, at least in part, in a larger European context.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we review mechanisms commonly used in
technology transfer. In section 3 we examine incentives to exploit these mechanisms in
the US and in section 4 we repeat the exercise for Sweden. Section 5 compares the rate
and success of commercialization in both countries. Section 6 examines possible
differences in the supply of ideas. Section 7 frames the results in a larger institutional
setting and section 8 concludes.
2. Commercialization of Academic R&D – Methods of Technology Transfer
An overriding fact that has significant bearing on our conclusions is the following: The
transfer of knowledge from the university to the commercial sector generally requires the
active involvement of university inventors.
1 In the US, ideas reach TLOs in primitive
states and much critical knowledge is often tacit. In one survey, Jensen and Thursby
(2001) find that at least 71 percent of inventions require further involvement by the
academic researcher if they are to be successfully commercialized. 48 percent of the ideas
are in proof of concept stage, 29 percent have a prototype available on a lab scale and for
only 8 percent is manufacturing feasibility known. The choice of instrument to facilitate
academic involvement must balance two central forces. On one hand, we should expect
different mechanisms to be most appropriate for transfer in various settings. On the other
hand, further involvement of the researcher may have a significant opportunity cost as
there is little reason to believe that activities facilitating commercialization also forward
an academic’s professional reputation. We first focus on the latter claim, by considering
the incentive structure normally faced by academics. We then consider different
mechanisms for technology transfer and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
each.
                                                
1 For some examples of this, see Gelijns and Rosenberg (1999).5
The academic reward structure encourages the production of knowledge that is a useful
input into other academics’ research.
2 Researchers wish to have their papers cited because
this is a signal that they have established a reputation within the academic community.
There is much evidence suggesting that the production of such knowledge is a central
objective of academic researchers, as citation measures are associated with higher income
and prestige (Cole, 1978; Diamond, 1986; Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stern, 1999). This
presents a potential difficulty in the commercialization of university ideas. There is little
reason to believe that the goal of producing useful inputs into the research of other
academics is congruent with the goal of producing commercially valuable knowledge.
Hence, effort directed at the production of commercially valuable knowledge will most
likely come at the expense of the production of reputation-enhancing academic
knowledge.
Of course, this is not categorically true. As Rosenberg (1982) and Stokes (1997) have
argued, there are many instances where academically valuable results can emanate from
research with practical goals and vice versa, commercially valuable knowledge can result
from research with very academically-oriented goals.
3 In addition, there are many cases
when the output of such research endeavors can be characterized as both commercially
valuable and important from an academic viewpoint. Recombinant DNA is a classic
example and the transistor effect is another. However, it would be surprising if this were
the norm, rather than the exception. For example, Goldfarb (2001) provides statistical
evidence that the pursuit of practical goals is unlikely to be congruent with the pursuit of
academic goals. Because of this, research sponsors with applied goals in mind have
difficulty building relationships with high-profile academics. Goldfarb’s study focuses on
academic engineers, a field where one might expect a goal conflict to be prominent.
However, even in biotechnology, a field where commercially valuable knowledge and
academically valuable knowledge are perhaps uniquely close, there can still be conflict.
According to one observer,
“I have recently visited a major teaching department in biophysics and molecular
biology… with a distinguished record in Ph. D. production. The faculty who had
                                                
2 The following discussion on academic goals draws heavily on Goldfarb (2001).
3 There is certainly great overlap between commercially valuable and practical knowledge. Although, there
are exceptions. Consider the following case: a biotech firm with little more than an idea could be sold, and
hence be commercially valuable, but the idea may yet be far from practical. But even here such knowledge
has the potential to be useful in the foreseeable future. And if the idea originated from a university, its
commercialization would likely require the inventor’s continuing involvement.6
commercial affiliations had a particular charm for incoming graduate students… The
dissertations … which were being handed out, had deteriorated in quality and some of
these were purely developmental product-oriented studies of little basic importance.”
--- D. Stetten Jr., “Recombinant molecules: Anxieties and Hazards.” In
Proceedings of the 1981 Battelle International Conference on Genetic Engineering, Vol 1.,
held in Rosslyn Virginia. June 6–10, 1981. pp. 63–64. Quoted in Kenney (1986, p. 117).
The incentive structure of academics does not encourage commercialization activity. If
anything, such activity is generally discouraged as it diverts effort from more fundamental
research endeavors. Hence, because successful technology transfer requires the
involvement of faculty, and this involvement will often continue after the academic value
of an innovation has been exhausted, the creation of incentives and the weakening of
disincentives for the academic to direct effort towards commercialization activities is
generally necessary for technology transfer.
We now focus on two groups of mechanisms. Three mechanisms that are commonly used
to elicit involvement in a project of commercial value are sponsored research, consulting
(including board activities), and starting a new firm. Three possible mechanisms of
inventor compensation are salary, royalties and equity. These mechanisms are distinct
from incentives associated with the academic reward structure described above, in that
they are specifically designed to facilitate the transfer of commercially valuable
knowledge. We will now discuss these mechanisms in detail.
Survey results suggest that the form of inventor involvement most preferred by academics
is research grants whereby the researcher continues research in her lab that is relevant to
the commercial endeavor (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Generally, there are special
provisions that allow the sponsor to extract rents from the potential results stemming from
sponsored research. This arrangement allows the researcher to hedge the downside risk of
lost academic opportunity which occurs if commercial pursuits are not aligned with
academic pursuits and time is allocated towards the new venture as opposed to academic
research. One might think that corporate-sponsored grants in themselves divert effort
away from “pure” academic research. Indeed, the results of Goldfarb (2001) suggest are
consistent with this theory. However, although research that is industry-funded is clearly
directed, researchers’ effort allocations are arguably less constrained in a grant
arrangement than when they are directly involved in a company as consultants, board7
members and/or founders.
4 Although this sort of research support provides weak
incentives, it is likely to be inexpensive. Furthermore, it may be appropriate in the very
early stages of research, or when sponsors believe that clauses which allow them to
examine results prior to publication along with intellectual property protection of results
are sufficient to provide rents from the research results. When knowledge is very tacit, we
would expect this arrangement to be insufficient; the academic may not have sufficient
incentives to effectively communicate results to the sponsoring firm as such activities take
away from the pursuit of academic results. In such cases, we might expect this mechanism
to be complemented by other mechanisms, such as consulting.
5
The second mechanism is consulting arrangements whereby the researcher either spends a
limited amount of time working for the firm and/or takes up a position on one of the firm's
boards. Academics are often compensated quite generously for such activities. Consulting
has a long tradition and most administrators have supported, or even encouraged, such
activity. Although there are numerous policies designed to regulate such activities in the
US, they are notoriously difficult to enforce (see Kenney, 1986, pp. 90–92).
Finally, the academic may found a new firm. When academics found firms this does not
necessarily imply that they leave their academic positions permanently, nor take a leave of
absence. Interviews with Stanford Office of Technology Licensing personnel
6 as well as
case studies (Kenney, 1986) suggests that frequently an academic will take up a
consulting position as well as a board position with the firm while a graduate student or
post-doctoral research associate will fill more active roles in the new firm. However, even
when the academic does take a secondary position, this arrangement remains distinct from
consulting in that a founder will generally have a significant equity position in the new
firm.
                                                
4 The proposition that researchers can and do substitute effort allocations is reflected in the spread of
conflict of interest policies. For example, some universities, such as Stanford, do not allow recipients of
grants to hold an interest in the company that is sponsoring them. The reason for this restriction is
specifically to avoid turning a lab into an outsourced research arm of the sponsoring firm at the expense of
academic pursuits. This policy would not be necessary if academic and commercial goals were aligned.
5 Another shortcoming of such as distributive research effort might be in coordination of research direction.
This would be particularly true if the output of the research was expected to fit into a larger system
(Monteverde and Teece, 1982).
6 Informal discussions between Brent Goldfarb and Stanford OTL personnel, May–June 2001.8
The first form of academic remuneration is wages. This mechanism provides the weakest
incentives to the academic to further the commercialization of the invention, as rewards
are not formally tied to the outcome of the venture.
7 Two alternatives are more successful
to this end: (i) providing some sort of performance based payment structure, such as
licensing royalties, or (ii) equity compensation. Jensen and Thursby (2001) demonstrate
theoretically that while both equity and licensing solve the moral hazard problem, equity
does not affect marginal costs, and hence does not distort output decisions.
We would expect incentives in consulting to be weaker as compared to royalties or equity
in that returns are not tied directly to outcomes.
8 When knowledge is largely tacit, as is
common in primitive technologies, significant academic effort is likely to be required for
success in commercialization. As we have argued, commonly, directing effort towards the
development and commercialization of such technologies provides fewer academic
rewards than the development of new academic results. Hence, high-powered incentives
which directly tie results to compensation will be a more effective tool to elicit academic
effort in such cases while consulting alone may be insufficient for transfer. However, this
reasoning does not allow us to understand when equity versus royalty compensation is
used. It should be noted that when academic involvement is needed, equity and royalty
compensation is commonly used in conjunction with consulting, or salary compensation.
That is, performance based compensation mechanisms generally strengthen incentives
provided in consulting arrangements.
Royalty arrangements only work if intellectual property rights can be asserted. Although
our understanding of when and in which combinations each of these mechanisms is
chosen in incomplete, there are some clues. Arora (1995) demonstrates that if property
rights are weak and knowledge is tacit the inventor will have little incentive to transfer
knowledge as she is likely to be held up.
9 This result suggests that when knowledge is
tacit and property rights are weak, the best means to provide incentives to the academic
researcher is via equity, which becomes an especially powerful incentive in a young,
                                                
7 One could imagine an implicit contract whereby successful consulting leads to successive arrangements.
8 Of course, this is attenuated with the implicit contract possible in a dynamic setting where future
consulting income is contingent on good performance.
9 Held up in the sense that the firm will not compensate the inventor once tacit knowledge (see also Anand
and Galetovic, 2000). The holdup problem can also be resolved if the potential licensee and the inventor
have developed a relationship and both expect to continue this relationship into the future.9
small company. We also know that the effectiveness of patent protection varies by
industry (Cohen et al., 2000). We should expect, then, that all things being equal,
academic entrepreneurship is more important in industries where property rights are weak,
(say, semiconductors) and less important in areas where patent protection is strong (say,
pharmaceuticals). Indeed, if intellectual property protection is particularly weak, we might
expect transfer to occur via consulting arrangements and by-pass the TLO altogether.
Shane (2001) finds evidence consistent with this thinking. When patent protection is
weak, TLOs are more likely to license inventions to the inventor. Generally, this involves
licensing the invention to a new startup, or in the language of the Swedish studies, to a
university spin-off. Because of the primitive nature of the technology when these firms are
founded, the risk is considerable (Rosenberg, 1996). Di Gregorio and Shane (2000) find
that universities are more likely to produce spin-offs if they are willing to make equity
investments in new firms in lieu of royalty agreements. This solves two problems. On one
hand it shifts some risk from the new firm to the university, as some royalty payments are
often required before any revenues are produced and second, it attenuates some of the
problems new firms face with liquidity constraints.
Our theoretical discussion also suggests that high powered incentives should be used
when knowledge is tacit and inventors’ opportunity costs are high which we might expect
if they are academically talented. This complements results of other researchers who have
distinguished between royalties and equity. Shane (2001) finds that equity is likely to be
more effective if royalty arrangements are less feasible, while Jensen and Thursby (2001)
theoretically demonstrate that equity is more efficient. Of course, the effectiveness of
commercializing through a new startup is also limited when there is great importance of
complementary activities. For example, a small company is unlikely to be able to move a
drug through clinical trials (Teece, 1986). However, the proliferation of startups in
biotechnology, a field where academic entrepreneurship is especially important, suggests
that this is not necessarily a binding constraint.
Ideally, we would now assess and compare the use of the above mechanisms in Sweden
and the US. Unfortunately, the data that relate to commercialization are incomplete. For
example, we know of no systematic data that describe consulting arrangements between
academics and industry, let alone data that describe how consulting is used together with10
licensing arrangements. While there are data that describe university spin-offs in Sweden,
we have not encountered comparable comprehensive data for the US. And while there are
data describing licensing activities in the US, there are no data describing such activities
in Sweden. This effectively limits our ability to make direct comparisons of the Swedish
and American experiences. Instead, we pursue the following strategy: we will first
compare the institutional setting and their resulting incentive structures in both countries,
insofar as they pertain to the commercialization of intellectual property. We will then
examine data, however imperfect, to explore whether they are consistent with our
conclusions about the different incentive structures.
3. The American System
The extent to which the above mechanisms are available and used within the U.S.
university system varies greatly. It is likely that the broader the menu of options is in any
given case, the easier it will be to fit the instrument to the technology and the more
probable that an invention will reach its full commercial value. The Federal government
has actively pursued policies aimed at facilitating this commercialization. Most
importantly, the Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities to appropriate the property rights to
an invention resulting from university research that was financed by federal grants.
11 This
Act was later expanded by public law 98-620. The fact that property rights were awarded
to the universities rather than the inventor gave strong incentives to universities to set up
their own offices of technology transfer that have become instrumental in negotiating the
appropriate mechanism for commercialization.
12 This US policy can be characterized as
one that gave universities incentives to respond to a commercial opportunity, but did not
dictate or even suggest what the best response to this opportunity was. The Act fostered
                                                
11 An explicit aim of the legislators was to keep the government out of the commercialization process
(Eisenberg, 1996).
12 The Bayh-Dole Act has a small business bias, in that small firms are to receive preference over large
firms when licensing decisions occur (37CFR 401.14, k.4). While we do not know how this clause is
implemented in practice generally, from examining marketing and licensing decisions at Stanford’s Office
of Technology Licensing, it is clear that this consideration takes a secondary place to the goal of finding a
firm that is capable of commercializing a new technology. Most importantly, in no way does a small firm
imply a start-up firm. In fact, it is Stanford’s policy to market new technologies to well-established firms,
large or small, before startups in the belief that established firms are more likely to succeed in
commercialization.11
and continues to foster much experimentation in university policies with respect to how to
best exploit this windfall of intellectual property.
13 This is a “bottom up” approach.
The bottom up approach reaches well beyond government policy. The structure of the
American university system is favorable towards such institutional experimentation and
competitive forces have led universities to adopt policies that encourage
commercialization of ideas. For example, American universities compete intensely for
financial support to push out the envelope of research frontiers in disciplines that have
come to produce useful knowledge. In recent years this has most notably been the case in
microelectronics, computer science and molecular biology. This competition for funds has
encouraged universities to accept grants from industry that restrict access to results
stemming from sponsored research, even though this is a policy that directly conflicts
with well-established academic norms. An additional important dimension of American
academic competition is reflected in a high degree of mobility on the part of faculty as
universities compete for talent and prestige. As the commercial value of faculty inventions
and services has become apparent, the demand for those services, especially those of
highly reputable scholars, has increased. In response, universities have adopted policies
needed to keep or attract these scientists. These policies include more liberal leave of
absence and consulting privileges that generally allow the academic to pursue his
commercial opportunities, while keeping his position as a faculty member intact (Kenney,
1986). Although there are potential benefits to such policies for the university, there are
also obvious costs. It is unlikely that such policies would have been adopted in a non-
competitive system (Rosenberg, 2000).
It might be surprising that we are arguing that awarding property rights to the university,
as opposed to the inventor, has successfully increased the incentives of inventors to
commercialize their activities. However, rewards are tied to project value as universities
have found it best policy to reward inventors, along with departments and schools with
                                                
13 The effect of the Bayh-Dole Act on the commercialization of ideas of university researchers is a
prominent question for students of the university-industry interface (Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg,
1998; Mowery, Nelson, Sampart, and Ziedonis, 2000; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2000). For example, Mowery
and Ziedonis (2000) find that although the Act encouraged the establishment of technology transfer offices
and coincided with a significant increase in university patenting at Stanford and within the UC system, they
argue that much of these activities would have occurred without it. They find that much of the increase in
university licensing can be attributed to the rapid growth in federal funding of biomedical research from
1960–1980 and other changes in federal policy toward intellectual property rights. This suggests, perhaps,
that Bayh-Dole was not an exogenous event, but rather reflected changing goals of universities.12
shares of proceeds from an invention.
14 Generally, universities also deduct funds to
recover expenses associated with licensing activities.
15 Hence, awarding property rights to
the university accomplished two goals. First, it encouraged the establishment of hundreds
of offices of technology transfer at universities. These offices relieve inventors from a
need to develop expertise in the legal and business sides of invention commercialization.
Second, since the offices typically cover expenses associated with marketing, patenting,
and licensing, inventors avoid the risk associated with covering such costs. Not only are
such activities expensive, but they are also time consuming. This implies that inventors
would incur substantial opportunity costs if they were to engage in such activities. When
these costs overwhelm the (additional) expected returns the inventor would have earned
had he had 100 percent of the intellectual property rights, commercialization becomes
more likely when rights are assigned to the university.
Of course, it is not necessarily the case that only university-run transfer offices could
provide these cost-reducing services whereas a private provider could not. There do not
seem to be compelling reasons that would rule this solution out.
16 However, as an
empirical reality private organizations have not filled the void in Sweden. This leaves
Swedish academic-entrepreneurs with the costly option of going it alone.
TLOs solicit invention reports from faculty inventors. Although faculty are often required
to complete these reports on a regular basis, it is often quite difficult to enforce this
policy. Nevertheless, recent work that has focused on the effects of the Bayh-Dole act
attribute a large share of increased patenting and licensing activities to successful
identification of inventions of potential commercial value and their development rather
                                                
14 Di Gregorio and Shane (2000) find that universities with policies with higher minimum inventor share of
royalties produce fewer startups. This result is consistent with the claim that opportunity costs associated
with entrepreneurship influence academics’ decisions.
15 We know of no general survey of distribution policies, but informal interviews with licensing personnel
suggest that generally the licensing offices receive proceeds to recover expenses, or perhaps some constant
share such as 15 percent and the remainder is distributed between the inventor, the inventor’s department,
and the inventor’s school. Other recipients include, at times, a general university fund and the inventor’s lab.
16 One may speculate that it may be easier for a university based transfer office to solve information
asymmetries pertaining to the quality of the invention through the establishment of reputation, an important
problem in technology markets. In addition, there may be complementarities between the office and other
university bodies that are best realized when the office is internal. For example, Argyres and Liebeskind
(1998) argue that by internalizing the functions of technology transfer, universities are able to minimize the
impact of conflicts of interest that arise between commercialization activities and open-science activities. At
the same time, it is important to point out that TLOs may behave suboptimally. Siegel et al. [2002] report
that they came across some TLOs that had an excessively legalistic or antagonistic approach, thereby
making commercialization more difficult.13
than a change in the character of academic’s research (Thursby and Kemp, 2001; Mowery
et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2000; Thursby and Thursby, 2000). This suggests that an
academic’s choice to disclose her inventions are a response to incentives of the TLO
system.
After a disclosure, TLOs evaluate the technology. If a favorable assessment is made, they
attempt to identify potential licensees. A choice of technology transfer instrument (e.g.,
exclusive, non-exclusive license or option, materials transfer agreement, etc.) and choice
of compensation mechanism associated with this agreement (royalties, equity, barter) are
the outcome of negotiations with the licensee. Although TLO personnel may participate in
negotiations that lead to complementary consulting or sponsored research arrangements,
these are never part of the licensing agreements themselves as the university does not have
the power to enforce such arrangements. TLOs provide valuable services. They encourage
faculty to identify valuable intellectual property. They evaluate the commercial potential
of inventions, they provide resources and expertise to protect the intellectual property,
they assist in finding potential licensees, and finally, they are instrumental in negotiating
with licensees and the formulation of license contracts.
In these efforts, TLOs commonly license technologies to established firms. This might be
a distinct advantage as a) established firms may be more likely to succeed in
commercialization as the added risk of developing capabilities in a new firm is avoided
and b) small firms may find it difficult to amass resources necessary for some technology
commercialization. The point is not to downplay the role of academic entrepreneurship.
On the contrary, we have argued that incentives in equity arrangements are likely to be
beneficial when significant academic effort is needed for success of a venture. Academic
entrepreneurship is often the most effective means to facilitate technology transfer. It is
important to understand, however, that it is not necessarily the best in all circumstances.
4. The Swedish System
The Swedish system of technology transfer has been much more directed. Bureaucratic
attempts to directly establish university policy have been the mainstay of Swedish efforts
to facilitate the transfer of potentially valuable intellectual property. As we shall see, these14
policies have largely ignored the importance of setting up incentives for universities and
academics to pursue the commercialization of ideas originating in academe.
On the surface, incentives for faculty appear very strong: A 1949 law guaranteeing
academic freedom also placed property rights emanating from their research entirely in
the hands of faculty members (lärarundantaget). However, the outcome has been more
complex. A consequence of full faculty ownership of property rights has been that the
universities themselves have had little incentive to become involved in technology
transfer to the commercial sector. In fact, as emphasized by Etzkowitz, Asplund and
Nordman (2000) it has often been in the interest of universities to discourage contacts
between faculty members and industry, since rigid civil servant pay schedules and other
constraints have made it very difficult for them to retain highly valued personnel who
have established personal ties with industry. Considering the extensive services provided
by American TLOs, the lack of university support in itself may discourage the pursuit of
commercialization opportunities.
This procedure is confounded by increased opportunity costs of pursuing new ventures.
Procedures for academic leave have not been adjusted to make it easier for professors to
take temporary leave to organize firms in the manner that has become widespread in the
US (see also Stankiewicz, 1986, p. 90). Under these circumstances, Swedish academics
are more likely to confine their external involvement to consulting activities, since to
proceed further may force them to take a binary decision to leave the university, and few
are prepared to do that (Etzkowitz et al., 2000).
In a system that discourages faculty involvement with industry beyond consulting and
where the property rights rest with the researcher, there is a lower likelihood that the
commercial benefits of academic research will be reaped. This is precisely because when
pursuing entrepreneurial ventures, the downside risk of failure of the venture is increased
as the researcher's faculty position is not ensured. The upside potential of the venture is
mired by additional uncertainty as faculty inventors are unlikely to have significant
business experience necessary to evaluate the market potential of new innovations. This
effect is further reinforced in Sweden where small firms tend to remain small, and this
may discourage decisions to pursue startups (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001). This is a
difficult situation. Vedin (1993) points out that if the owner of the property rights shows15
little interest in exploitation, very little is likely to happen. This is also found by Etzkowitz
et al. (2000), who conclude that “since most professors have little interest in
commercializing their rights, or naively presume that discovery should somehow
automatically produce rewards, relatively little use was made of these rights.”
However, not only does awarding property rights to an individual create disincentives for
the university, when property rights rest solely with the individual researcher, there is no
“profit sharing” with his/her department. This has probably given rise to anti-
entrepreneurial peer pressure at Swedish universities. Informal interviews as well as an in-
depth government report on the collaboration between university and industry (SOU
1996:70, pp. 158–59) point to the existence of such pressure (see also Kenney, 1986, p.
116). US TLOs have mitigated this problem by awarding proceeds to the inventor’s
department.
Several scholars studying the Swedish university/industry interface emphasize that,
analogous to what Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998), Audretsch and Stephan (1996) and
Siegel, Waldman and Link (2002) have found for the US, personal contacts are essential
(e.g., Uhlin et al., 1992 and Etzkowitz et al., 2000). It is clear, however, that these
contacts have been mainly with large firms, and it has turned out that the large firms have
preferred that these contacts remain informal in nature. However, since many technologies
are successfully licensed to large firms, it is possible that university personnel are
successfully transferring their ideas through consulting arrangements, but not earning
royalties because of insufficient licensing infrastructure.
But an absence of licensing agreements, or even increased difficulty in arranging them, is
a significant restriction for transfer of intellectual property. Academics are much less
likely to face strong incentives to continue to devote time and resources to successful
commercialization when consulting is the only tool.
The Swedish private sector is greatly dominated by large firms (Henrekson and
Jakobsson, 2001). As shown by Braunerhjelm (1998) industrial R&D is also highly
concentrated to a few very large firms; in 1994 four multinationals carried out more than
70 percent of total R&D among multinationals. These large firms source knowledge from
the outside mainly from highly specialized (mostly consultancy) firms: 28 percent of all16
R&D in private industry in 1993 (13,700 of a total of 48,700 man years) was carried out
in these firms (SOU 1996:70, p. 32). Thus, directly and indirectly, large multinational
corporations tend to dominate private R&D activities in Sweden. Moreover, the large
multinationals seem to be internally focused in their R&D effort in that they carry out a
large share of their R&D in Sweden, while an increasingly large share of their production
takes place outside of Sweden (Braunerhjelm and Ekholm, 1998).
17
These facts reflect what has been characterized as the Swedish large-firm model of high
tech innovation (Granstrand and Alänge, 1995; Lindholm Dahlstrand, 1997a; Edquist and
Lundvall, 1993).
One additional disadvantage of large firms is that they are generally unwilling, or unable,
to offer high-powered incentives to inventors (Anand and Galetovic, 2000).
18 As a result,
they lack one potentially powerful tool to entice university faculty to cooperate efficiently
with them. This is, of course, yet another reflection of the Swedish large-firm model of
high tech innovation (Granstand and Alänge, 1995; Lindholm Dahlstrand, 1997a).
Edquist, Eriksson and Sjögren (2000) compare the sourcing of knowledge among (mostly
small) high-tech firms in Sweden. They confirm that cooperation with universities is of
limited importance compared to cooperation with other firms. Braunerhjelm et al. (2000)
and Carlsson (2002) report findings from detailed studies of the biomedical clusters in
Ohio and Sweden. They find that Ohio firms have been more successful in establishing
links with the science and research community. The biomedical cluster consists mainly of
small firms, and these firms have greater difficulties to establish links with universities
than large Swedish firms. Carlsson (2002, p. 366) concludes that “the supporting
organizational infrastructure, particularly with respect to venture capital and intermediary
                                                
17 This is not to say that within the group of large firms, the technology acquisition strategies of large firms
in Sweden differ from the strategies of their counterparts in other countries. Granstrand et al. (1992) do not
find any statistically significant differences between the perceived importance of various technology
strategies among a sample of multinational high-tech firms in the US, Japan and Sweden in the 1980s.
18 Anand and Galetovic (2000) discuss why it is often difficult for large, multi-product firms to tie rewards
to a project’s success. They point out that large firms can manipulate their accounts and hence costs
associated with a specific project are non-verifiable. Drawing from Alchian and Demsetz (1972), they point
out that many aspects of a firm’s activities are shared across projects, for example, lab facilities, purchasing
operations and managerial time. In addition, products are often cross-sold or bundled. Hence, not only will
larger firms have a disincentive to correctly attribute costs to a project if outside compensation is tied to
these costs, it may also be genuinely difficult to do so. Of course, large firms could compensate inventors17
(bridging) organizations, is more developed in Ohio than in Sweden. These organizations
contribute to a more rapid diffusion and utilization of technologies.”
Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001) point out that the Swedish government has attempted to
address the failures in technology transfer for the last quarter century. The policies used
have included an extension of the universities’ mandate in 1975 to communicate to the
surrounding society results emanating from university research, and how they can be
applied. This objective was eventually interpreted to imply collaboration between
universities and private industry. This was formalized in 1998 (SOU 1998:128, pp. 153–
154) where universities “are exhorted to be open to influences from the outside world,
disseminate information about their teaching and research activities outside academia, and
to facilitate for the surrounding society to gain access to relevant information about
research results. Each university is also obligated to draw up and implement its own path
for collaboration with the surrounding society. This plan has to be submitted for approval
to the Ministry of Education” (p. 11).
This collaboration has taken many forms: Commissioned research projects, industry
consulting, doctoral studies hosted in industrial labs, salaries paid by industry, research
institutes and other organizations run jointly by universities and industry, university
employed contact secretaries who act as mediators between university and small and
medium size businesses. It is notable that none directly took into account the academic’s
role in commercialization.
The success of these policies is mixed. Currently, industry-funded research has reached
2/3 of US levels, approximately five percent of academic research funding. University
personnel are allowed to consult one day a week and often do. In contrast, the contact
secretary program is generally regarded as a failure (Olofsson and Stymne, 1995). This is
not surprising, as not only do they operate in a restricted environment; Swedish
universities may be hostile to their activities if they believe they may lose academic
personnel.
                                                                                                                                                  
with royalties tied to sales. However, there is little evidence that this occurs with any frequency in Sweden,
if at all.18
In addition, since 1994 seven broker institutions called Technology Bridging Foundations
(Teknikbrostiftelser) have been established in major university regions. Their task has
been to mediate commercialization of R&D from universities, SMEs and individual
inventors by facilitating the patenting process, matching up VC funding etc. In addition,
four foundations, such as the Foundation for Knowledge and Competence Development,
have been established which, among other things, are intended to provide a bridge
between the university and industry. Although it is too early to evaluate the performance
of these institutions, they will have several hurdles to overcome. In mediating
commercialization of intellectual property, the Technology Bridging Foundations seem
designed to accept responsibilities that in the US lie in the hands of university TLOs.
Since Swedish universities do not gain from this commercialization, it is fair to assume
that resistance to such activities by administrators and other faculty will continue. In
addition, TLOs are not simply intermediaries, rather they help identify and protect
intellectual property as well. To succeed, the bridging institutions will need to provide
similar services.
The central difference between Swedish attempts at facilitating commercialization and the
American experience is that in Sweden mechanisms are designed from above, while in the
US they are encouraged to evolve from below and the intervention of policy has been
largely to find ways to create incentives for such commercialization.
The above analysis has focused on the mechanisms best suited to facilitate the
exploitation of university ideas and it also explored the rigid Swedish system so as to
demonstrate that these mechanisms are often unavailable. However, it would be
disingenuous to suggest that the reasons discussed above are the sole suspects for a weak
Swedish performance in technology transfer. Sweden’s private equity markets,
underdeveloped until recently, have made it difficult to direct resources to
commercialization efforts, its heavy taxation of entrepreneurial income dampens
incentives to become an entrepreneur and its restrictive labor laws arguably are more
harmful to small employers. These issues are discussed at length in Henrekson and
Rosenberg (2000, 2001). During the last decade, Sweden has enacted several policies that
have lowered the taxation of entrepreneurial income, relaxed some labor law restrictions
and liberalized capital markets. Perhaps because of these policies, Sweden enjoyed an IPO
renaissance in its stock market in the latter half of the 1990s. Furthermore, Di Gregorio19
and Shane (2000) find that the geographic proximity of VC funds is not a contributor to
university start-ups, suggesting that if private equity markets are working at all, then good
ideas will get funded. That said, Sweden's private equity market, even today, operates in a
more restrictive environment than the US (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2000, 2001).
5. The Swedish and American Experiences
This section compares the Swedish and American experiences in the commercialization of
technology. This comparison is confounded by the nature of the data. In contrast to the
US, there is a lack of comprehensive data that tracks the transfer of intellectual property
from universities to the private sector in Sweden. There are several studies in which the
unit of observation in Swedish studies is the firm, or spin-off. That is, the Swedish data
inform us of all technology transfer in which the mechanism of transfer is a new firm,
regardless of the existence of legally protected intellectual property. However, in US
studies that use data from technology licensing offices, the unit of observation is usually
the invention. These data report all transfer of defendable intellectual property and the
mechanism by which the property was commercialized, if at all. Because of these
constraints, we are only able to establish that the entrepreneurial avenue in Sweden is
functioning rather poorly.
The reason for this difference in data availability foreshadows some of the conclusions of
this study. The US data have been collected in various efforts (see below) from university
technology licensing offices (TLOs). TLOs maintain a centralized source of data
pertaining to their intellectual property. TLOs do not maintain data pertaining to
consulting activities, nor do they follow all “spin-off” firms in which the founders are
university employees, rather, they will do this only if the firm is using a technology that
can be licensed. For example, we do not observe spin-off consulting firms in the US. In
Sweden, property rights for innovations lie entirely with the inventor. Since universities
lack an incentive to facilitate the transfer, central records of each innovation are
unavailable, hence we do not observe transfer of technologies directly to large firms. This
is unfortunate, as the basic normative concern of economists is not whether ideas are
being commercialized specifically in new firms, but rather whether university ideas are20
being commercialized and contributing to the improvement of human welfare. The US
data provide a more complete picture in which to assess this question.
This point cannot be overemphasized. In the Swedish studies, the criterion for entering the
study is whether or not the firm was founded by university-based faculty. However, in the
US close to 90 percent of university ideas were commercialized by methods other than the
establishment of new firms (AUTM Survey, 1998).
Although we cannot compare how the transfer via large firms is working, we can establish
that the entrepreneurship avenue is not working particularly well in Sweden. A careful
reading of the research into small technology companies in Sweden reveals that none of
them have become a large, significant presence in the Swedish economy (Utterback and
Reitberger, 1982; Rickne and Jacobsson, 1996, 1999) and that this seems especially
pronounced in the subset of these firms which are university spin-offs (Olofsson and
Wahlbin, 1993; Lindholm Dahlstrand, 1997a, 1997b).
Although there are no directly comparable data in the US, at least by two measures TLO
startups perform strongly. The TLO startups since 1980 have enjoyed a 70 percent
survival rate through 1997 (AUTM, 1998). In addition, in 1998, universities held
positions in 203 publicly held and 523 privately held companies. Although we cannot
deduce from this number the exact percentage of university start-ups that go public, it is at
minimum 8 percent.
21 This suggests that this mechanism of technology transfer from
universities to the private sector is limited in Sweden by the large-firm bias in Sweden’s
institutional structure (see also Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2000).
We wish to make clear that the lower levels of startup activity in Sweden do not imply
that Sweden is not commercializing any of its academic inventions. Indeed examining
startups alone misses the lion's share of the transfer activity. In the US from 1980 through
1997, there were also 11,784 invention disclosures, 4,808 patent filings and 3,224
awarded patents, 3,668 new licenses, with only some 12 percent to start-up companies.
                                                
21 This is under the assumption that these positions are all in companies founded since 1980 and that
universities never liquidate their positions. It was extremely rare for universities to take equity positions21
These figures are included to emphasize that in examining startup activities alone, as in
Sweden, one misses a majority share of potential transfer activity.
This point is significant. The fact that university spin-offs do not lead to dynamic large
firms does not necessarily imply that all valuable technologies are not being
commercialized. Close to 90 percent of U.S. technologies are transferred to existing firms.
If large firms are the best way to commercialize many university technologies, this may
be favorable to Sweden as there is a strong large-firm bias in Swedish institutions, such as
the tax code (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001). Hence, the absence of the entrepreneurial
avenue may not be important if university technologies similar to those transferred via
small firms in the US are effectively commercialized through larger firms in Sweden.
Although there are no data with which to evaluate this proposition, it does not seem
particularly likely. To support this proposition, one would have to believe, from a positive
standpoint, that an environment in which small and new firms are disadvantaged is as
conducive to commercialization of novel technologies as one in which they are not.
We employ two lines of argument to discredit this criticism. First, continuing involvement
of academics is generally required for successful commercialization of their invention. If,
as argued in section 2, larger firms are less able to provide strong incentives to academics
than smaller firms, then large firms may not be the best way to facilitate
commercialization in all circumstances. This statement is supported by empirical
evidence. The best environment for innovation, in terms of firm size, is subject to
significant variance (Pavitt, 1984; Acs and Audretsch, 1988; see also Cohen 1995 for a
survey of a literature on innovation and firm size). The entrepreneurial avenue appears
especially important in the commercialization of biotechnology, an area where,
historically, knowledge has been very tacit (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Zucker, Darby
and Brewer, 1998). In addition, this field is economically significant as biotechnological
innovations have constituted a large share of university patenting activity in the US
(Henderson et al., 1998). Indeed, in a complementary article to this one, Gittelman (2002)
finds a general absence of commercialization of biotechnology discoveries
22 in France.
She attributes this absence to academics’ incentives, which are much more similar to their
                                                                                                                                                  
before 1980 (Feldman et al., 2001, figure 1), and as reflected by the USD 40M in revenue from liquidating
equity positions in 1998, it is also untrue that universities never liquidate their positions.
22 As measured by protein-based compounds that have reached the clinical trials stage.22
Swedish colleagues’ than to their American counterparts’. In contrast, in the transfer of
small molecule discoveries, low-powered incentives such as research grants, awards or
fee-consulting, appear adequate (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998). These authors also find
that greater innovative output, as measured by patenting, increases as a firm’s scientists
co-author more with university collaborators. The fact that close to 10 percent of Swedish
biotechnology articles with university authors are co-authored annually with scientists
working in private firms and that 2/3 of these articles are coauthored with two large
Swedish pharmaceuticals (Sandström, 2000) is consistent with the proposition that
transfer of small molecule discoveries has been occurring in Sweden.
23 Second, in an
argument we do not explore here in any detail, firms may be more reluctant to
commercialize technologies that cannibalize existing markets or are perceived to be
outside their focus (Christensen, 1997). Hence, based on the above arguments, we find the
proposition that large firms fill the void of small firms in Sweden difficult to defend.
The point of this section was to demonstrate not only that the influence of new firms on
the Swedish economy has been meager in recent years and that this likely stifled a share
of academic innovations, but also to make a more subtle point: any assessment of the
expected return of a new venture is likely to be low. Anecdotes of small firms which grew
to be large successful firms in recent memory are rare in Sweden, which will influence
academics' decision-making processes.
Although we do not claim that the comparison of Swedish and the US experiences is
conclusive, we believe that the Swedish system has, at least until very recently, shut down
the entrepreneurial avenue of commercialization. This most likely hindered
commercialization activity. In some fields, such as biotechnology, the problem may have
been severe.
                                                
23 It is beyond the scope of this article to exhaustively explore the relative importance of the entrepreneurial
mechanism in commercialization by type of innovation and industry. We feel that this is an important topic
for future study as the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that in some economically
important fields, such as biotechnology, entrepreneurship is unambiguously important while in other fields it
is not.
24 1998 may not be a representative year. However, historical data from AUTM suggests that the annual rate
of increase in royalty revenues from 1991 to 1998 is 10–20 percent (see AUTM, 1998, pp. 51–52). Figure is
in 1998 dollars.
25 The remainder came from fees not associated with sales, such as upfront licensing fees and options.23
6. The Supply of Ideas
Of more direct interest to this study because of its direct relevance to R&D policy, it is
useful to explore to what extent a slow rate of technology transfer might be due to a low
supply of university ideas.
It is straightforward to establish that there is extensive support for academic research in
Sweden. R&D conducted in the university sector, as a share of GDP, is consistently the
highest in Sweden when compared to the US and other OECD countries.
26 An extremely
large share of R&D conducted by persons holding a Ph. D. is carried out in the university
sector in Sweden – in 1993 the total volume of R&D conducted by Ph. D.’s in Sweden
amounted to 9,650 man years, and 52 percent (5,000 man years) of this volume was
carried out at universities (SOU 1996:70, p. 32).
27,28 This large concentration of resources
in universities has led to a comparably large contribution to academic knowledge. In terms
of publications (in recognized professional journals) per billion U.S. dollars of GDP,
Sweden was second only to Israel in 1995 in terms of publications relative to the size of
the economy, while the U.S. ranked 20th at less than half the Swedish level (National
Science Board, 2000).
As noted above, comparisons of relative performance may not be helpful when trying to
determine if there if the supply of ideas is sufficient to create a meaningful number of
commercial opportunities in relevant fields. The Swedish academic performance in
biotechnology is arguably significant. Between 1986 and 1997 Sweden produced 28,418
academic papers in biotechnology which is roughly 8 percent of U.S. levels and 2 percent
of the global share.
29,30 Certain institutes have remarkable levels of output. For instance,
                                                
26 As used here the term universities also includes colleges.
27 It is approximately 6 percentage points higher when measured as a share of labor input rather than as a
share of expenditure – see OECD, Basic Science and Technology Statistics on diskette, 1997.
28 According to the same source 76 percent of total R&D at universities was in technology, natural sciences,
biomedicine and agricultural sciences.
29 These figures were drawn by Sandström (2000) from the Science Citation Index. The publisher of the
index, ISI, categorizes journals by field. The Swedish statistics reflect papers in journals of the following
fields: Biochemistry and molecular biology, biophysics, biotechnology and applied microbiology, cell
biology, medical chemistry, mathematical methods for biology and medicine, biomaterial science, micro-
biology, neuroscience and virology. The index is not a comprehensive list of all publications, rather it
focuses on journals that are most highly cited.
30 We should be cautious in comparing these academic output measures of the US and Sweden. The
categories of the U.S. statistics are not identical to those from the Swedish study. Both statistics are drawn
from the Science Citation Index. However, if anything, these estimates understate the Swedish24
the Karolinska Institute has been producing between 500 and 900 articles annually during
this period and around 10 percent of these were with industrial collaborators. In addition,
Swedish authors are publishing in more important journals (see Sandström, 2000, for
further detail). But, the fact that Sweden is producing academically valuable output does
not indicate that that output is commercially valuable. For example, despite this high
record of publication, from 1986–1997 Swedish inventors are responsible for less than 1
percent of new U.S. patents in biotechnology, and 30 percent of those were due to two
large pharmaceuticals (Sandström et al. 2000). This commercialization record appears to
be changing. Sandström et al. also report that there are currently around 150 small and
medium-size biotechnology companies in Sweden, which is just over 1/3 the number of
such companies in California.
31 A large share of these companies originated in the late
1990s, perhaps in response to a series of reforms that diminished the small-firm bias in the
Swedish tax code and an increase in the availability of venture capital funds (Henrekson
and Rosenberg 2001). Sandström et al. report qualitative data in which players in the
biotechnology industry specifically identify incentive problems of academics as a barrier
to further cooperation between university researchers and the biotechnology industry. A
university-industry interface that correctly takes into account academics' and universities'
incentives will further increase the production and exploitation of commercially valuable
ideas.
Attempting to establish whether or not commercial influences are strong enough to affect
the direction of academic work (as opposed, for example, to influencing the sharing of
information among colleagues) is a difficult endeavor. There is a small literature
attempting to shed light on this question, and the results are mixed. On one hand,
Mansfield (1995) finds that university researchers who receive research grants from
industry report that “problems they worked on in their academic research frequently or
predominantly developed out of their industrial consulting – and in many cases, the cited
academic researchers' government-funded work stemmed from ideas and problems they
encountered in industrial consulting”. Over 1/2 reported that the direction of their work
and choice of topics were influenced by potential sponsors or users of their research
output. This evidence suggests these researchers are producing knowledge that has higher
                                                                                                                                                  
accomplishment as the U.S. statistics reflect publications in a broader category of biomedical research
(National Science Board 2000, appendix table 6-48).
31 American data is from Ernst & Young, Focus on Fundamentals: The Biotechnology Report, 2000.25
commercial value than if they had lacked industry connections. On the other hand, Brooks
and Randazzese’s (1998) brief survey of evidence suggests that industry influences may
affect the academic value of output. However, if there is an effect, it is quite weak. We
note that this implies that any affect on academic output does not correlate very well with
its traditional measures, publications and citations. That is, by virtue of their connections
with industry, there is little evidence to support the claim that university researchers are
producing output of less academic value. Other evidence is mixed. Goldfarb (2001) finds
that researchers supported from a very applied government program do not produce output
that is less cited than those who do not. However, he also finds that those supported
researchers produced less output in general compared to those who were not supported.
Di Gregorio and Shane (2000) find that universities that receive research funds from
industry are more likely to produce more startups. However, the effect, if it exists at all, is
very weak. Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) find that the mean importance of
university patents declined between 1965 and 1988, a time when commercial influence on
academic research has been increasing. However, Thursby and Thursby (2000) suggest
that universities have also exhibited an increased propensity to patent marginal inventions,
which would suggest that Henderson et al. (1998) are finding a shift in university
patenting policies rather than a shift in the overall portfolio.
The evidence of how the perception of entrepreneurial opportunity affects the choice of
research decisions is limited to anecdotes. Kenney (1986) finds several examples of
academic research being directed towards commercial goals when the principal
investigator has a financial interest in a certain direction of research. However, these
examples all pertain to research undertaken after  a venture had begun and when the
primary investigator had an equity stake in the sponsoring company. One might
hypothesize that once researchers observe colleagues engaged in commercial activities,
they might intensify their search for commercially valuable ideas themselves. Di Gregorio
and Shane (2000) report a skewed distribution of start-up activities in a few universities,
especially those located in areas with much entrepreneurial activity. This fact would
support such a hypothesis. However, at present, it is not possible to determine whether
this effect, if it exists, is small or large. This ignorance makes it difficult to assess if the
supply of ideas of potential commercial value in Sweden is retarded by simple comparison26
of incentive structures. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Swedish university personnel have
strong incentives to produce commercially valuable knowledge.
7. The Larger Institutional Context
Before we make policy recommendations, it is prudent to recognize that the policies
aimed at facilitating technology transfer exist in the larger context of their respective
university systems. In contrast to the Swedish system, American universities are highly
decentralized and intensely competitive. The decentralization implies that American
universities retain a high degree of autonomy, thus pursuing opportunities for solving their
own problems and for building upon their own unique strengths and aspirations.
Competition takes place along several dimensions: (1) competition for students among
universities (including competition between private and state institutions), and at the
graduate level among professors for the best students; (2) competition among universities
for the best professors in a cultural and economic context where the mobility of professors
is very high; (3) competition among professors for research support, which provides
released time from teaching and access to research assistants, equipment and other
requisite materials. A university that can offer high quality teaching in fields for which
there is a strong demand in labor markets can also charge higher tuition fees, which also
leads to higher revenues.
As a result of the decentralization and the competition that takes place at so many levels,
the US university system has become more responsive to the economic needs of society.
32
In order to justify high tuition fees, students expect a high degree of relevance of the
offered curricula. Likewise, professors who are dependent upon research grants in order to
be able to pursue a successful research career, are more likely to adjust their research
interests to fields that have a high current or expected future economic value (Rosenberg,
2000).
Because of the decentralization and the competition among universities for professors
who are visibly productive, the American system tends to result in greater salary
dispersion, where salary differences are likely to reflect the economic relevance of the27
professor's field of specialization as well as his/her higher achievements as a researcher
and teacher. Generally, professors active in research prefer to teach at the graduate level,
where course content is closer to research at the frontier of the discipline and where
students may come to play crucial roles in advancing those frontiers. Rosenberg (2000)
presents evidence showing how rapidly entirely new fields as well as major breakthroughs
in established fields have been introduced into the curricula at leading US universities
over the years. In the US, therefore, universities can, to a considerable degree, be regarded
as endogenous institutions that tend to be characterized by an impressive capability, as
well as a strong incentive, to adjust to changes in the outside environment. Competition
for faculty is particularly relevant. Kenney (1986) finds that universities often adopt
liberal policies in order to attract top faculty.
In these respects the Swedish and, for that matter, the corresponding systems in most
other European countries differ substantially from the American university system.
Traditionally, European professors have, by and large, been civil servants working within
the public sector, which implies that a high degree of national uniformity has been
imposed on pay schedules, rules for promotion and recruitment and other working
conditions. Essentially, this is still the case also in Sweden, although it should be noted
that greater flexibility in terms of pay schedules has been introduced during the 1990s.
Nevertheless, the Swedish system differs from the American system in a number of
important respects that are likely to impact unfavorably on the inclination to introduce
changes in curricula and research orientation in order to accommodate the changing needs
of the economy.
First, there is a greater separation of teaching and research. The bulk of undergraduate
teaching at Swedish universities is carried out by lecturers who do not do research. This is
likely to slow down the pace at which important new research findings are integrated into
the curricula. If there are strong complementarities between teaching and research,
teaching is likely to benefit when research-oriented faculty delivers it. Also, research is
probably better when it is carried out in association with advanced students in an
intellectual environment that encourages and rewards informed criticism.
                                                                                                                                                  
32 Argyres and Liebeskind (1998) examine the adaptation of US universities from a different perspective.
However, their factual description is fundamentally similar.28
Second, in contrast to the US, the Swedish university system is highly centralized. All
universities are government-owned,
33 and entry of private universities is disallowed. The
central government is the body that grants charters to universities, and in practice it also
decides on the rules of admission and the size of a university (through budgetary
allocations), as well as the size of specific fields of study. Due to this strong influence
from the central government there is also much less leeway for individual institutions to
allow remuneration to track an individual professor's research and teaching performances
more closely and to vary the level of remuneration according to the economic value of the
professor's field of specialization. Moreover, greater centralization also makes it more
difficult for individual universities to adjust the allocation of its research budget across
fields in response to changing demand outside the university.
One way of illustrating this lesser ability to adjust to changing needs is given by the
comparison by Jacobsson, Sjöberg and Wahlström (2001) of the number of degrees
awarded at the B. Sc. and M. Sc. levels in electrical/electronic engineering and computer
science in Sweden and the US, relative to active-age population in the 1977–95 period.
For a very long time there was an excess demand for engineers within this specialization
in Sweden. Still, the university system was slow to respond to this increased demand
through an expansion in teaching. In the US, on the other hand, the number of degrees
awarded tripled from 1977 to 1986, while the Swedish expansion did not take off until the
number of degrees awarded had already peaked and begun to decrease in the US “market
driven” system.
34 When the number of B. Sc. degrees began to decrease, the US
experienced a dramatic upgrading, with a large increase in the number of M. Sc. and Ph.
D. degrees awarded (National Science Board, 2000).
The point, then, is not that the Swedish system of higher education simply failed to
respond to a huge increase in the demand for trained personnel in the burgeoning fields of
microelectronics and computer science. Rather, the point is that the response did occur,
but it occurred, from a purely economic point of view, much too slowly. In considering
                                                
33 With the exception of the Stockholm School of Economics, founded in 1909 and admitting 300
undergraduates per year. However, the School’s contract with the central government bans tuition fees.
34 Much of this increase may have reflected an export, in that many of the recipients of this training were
foreign students. For example, in 1999 1/3 of Ph.D. recipients in the US were non-US citizens. This
suggests that not only has the US system been responsive to US needs, it has been responsive to a broader
opportunity and pursued excellence in recruiting the very best students worldwide.29
universities in their specific role as suppliers of trained personnel in appropriate fields of
study, timing is a crucial consideration. In competitive world markets, large economic
rents are commonly available to those firms (and those countries) that can respond most
quickly to economic opportunities opened up by new technologies or new disciplines. But
late arrivals are most likely to find that the large financial rewards have already been
captured as competitive forces have driven prices down to much lower levels.
Third, in Sweden and other European countries, university degree requirements are
typically formulated as a fixed program rather than a flexible accumulation of
requirements and credits as in the US. In such a system it is therefore more difficult to
make changes than in the American case. Etzkowitz et al. (2000) present evidence from
their interviews that it is very difficult to change courses quickly and to introduce new
fields in the old Swedish universities.
The above discussion demonstrates that Swedish universities have a tendency to be
insular. It is likely that this ivory-tower effect transcends the educational objective to the
research objective as well.
8. Conclusions
Sweden is a country putting a great deal of resources into R&D; R&D spending relative to
GDP has been the highest in the world for more than a decade. On per capita levels, the
country also hosts several world-leading firms with a high R&D intensity, it holds a world
class position in terms of publication rates in leading academic journals, and its
government invests massively, given Sweden's size, in the building of organizations to
bridge the gap between university research and industry. In some key fields, Sweden is
producing large absolute amounts of scientific output as well. At the same time, incentives
for academics to establish intellectual property rights and pursue commercialization of
their technologies are weak. Although the general performance of technology transfer in
Sweden is unknown, it is clear that the performance of its academic-based startups is
weak. The U.S. picture, on the other hand, is quite different.30
This study attributes this difference to the distinct policies pursued by Sweden and the
United States. The Swedish government has pursued a portfolio of policies aimed at
directing funds at entrepreneurial activities in general, and specifically at the
commercialization of academic research output. These policies have been largely
ineffective due to a lack of incentives for academic researchers to become involved in the
commercialization of their ideas. This, in turn, has likely dampened the incentives for
academics to pursue commercially relevant areas of research and/or exploit commercially
relevant applications of generic knowledge. The environment created by the Swedes sits
in stark contrast to that in the U.S. In the U.S., the emergence of the flexibility needed to
exploit commercially valuable research output is due to the relative lack of regulation as
well as the intensive competition for research funds by researchers and research talent by
universities. In particular, academics in the U.S. are relatively free to respond to market
incentives for the commercialization of their ideas. By contrast, in Sweden, researchers
risk being penalized for attempting to commercialize their ideas. These results are likely
to be widespread throughout Europe. For example, Gittelman (2002) suggests that poor
performance in the commercialization of university biotechnology results in France is due
to lack of incentives for French scientists to get involved in the commercialization
process.
We have also pointed out that universities have strong influence on academics extra-
curricular activities. When policies are top-down, the desire of universities to implement
them may vary, especially, as we have described above, since these universities face
conflicting incentives. This has, in turn, affected academics’ incentives to pursue
commercial opportunities. Not only has it dampened financial incentives, especially
because of larger downside risk, but it has also created de facto professional penalties for
engaging in commercializing activities. Therefore, a policy aimed at encouraging the
commercialization of intellectual property should recognize that universities have the
ability to restrict the pursuit by their faculty of commercialization opportunities, and
policies directing them to encourage such activities are likely to fail if they are unlikely to
gain from such pursuits.
Interestingly, putting property rights in the hands of the inventor does not automatically
create the best incentives for commercialization. To facilitate involvement in
commercialization activities, not only must an academic inventor face strong incentives in31
the market for technology, but she must also not face strong disincentives in her university
environment. The system works better when incentives are aligned.
Because of lack of data, we were only able to determine that Sweden has performed
poorly in academic entrepreneurship. We have discussed conditions where this
shortcoming is significant and with the likely under-harvesting of research results in the
field of biotechnology. The exploration of the impact of the Swedish (indeed European)
incentive structure on other fields remains an open question.
Hence, even if the goal of a policy is to facilitate the commercialization of academic
ideas, one cannot draw the conclusion that, based on US experience, property rights
should be handed over to the university. First, awarding property rights to universities
works in the US because universities are largely autonomous, competitive institutions. In
Sweden, however, universities are state- owned bureaucracies. Further study is needed to
determine if, after adopting this policy, university bureaucrats would face strong enough
incentives to develop offices similar to US Technology Licensing Offices. Second, even if
such a policy worked, it is unclear if the benefits would be widespread enough to offset
the costs in terms of the sacrifice of academic norms.32
References
Acs, Z and Audretsch, D., 1988, Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis. American
Economic Review 78, 678–690.
Alchian, A., and Demsetz, H., 1972, Production, information costs and economic organization. American
Economic Review 62, 777–795.
Anand B., and Galetovic, A., 2000, Weak property rights and holdup in R&D, Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy 9, 615–642.
Argyes, N. and Liebeskind, J., 1998, Privatizing the intellectual commons: universities and the
commercialization of biotechnology. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 35, 427–454.
Association of University Technology Managers, 1998, AUTM licensing survey (Association of Technology
Managers, Norwalk, CT).
Arora, A., 1995, Licensing tacit knowledge: intellectual property rights and the market for know-how.
Economics of Innovation and New Technology 4, 41–59.
Audretsch, D. and Stephan, P., 1996, Company-scientist locational links: The case of biotechnology. American
Economic Review 86, 641–652.
Braunerhjelm, P., 1998, Varför leder inte ökade FoU-satsningar till mer högteknologisk export? Ekonomiska
Samfundets Tidskrift 51, 113–122.
Braunerhjelm, P., Carlsson, B., Cetindimar, D. and Johansson, D., 2000, The old and the new: The evolution of
polymer and biomedical clusters in Ohio and Sweden. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 10, 471–488.
Braunerhjelm, P. and Ekholm, K., 1998, The geography of multinational firms (Kluwer, Boston).
Brooks, H. and Randazzese, L., 1998, University-industry relations: The next four years and beyond. In L.
Branscomb and J. Keller (Editors), Investing in Innovation (MA: MIT Press, Cambridge).
Carlsson, B., 2002, Summary and conclusions. In Carlsson, B. and Stankiewicz, R., 2002, New technological
systems in the bio industries: An international study (Kluwer, Dordrecht).
Cockburn, I. and Henderson, R., 1998, Absorptive capacity, coauthoring behavior and the organization of
research in drug discovery. Journal of Industrial Economics 46, 157–182.
Cohen, W., Nelson, R., and Walsh, J,. 2000. Protecting their intellectual assets: appropriability conditions and
why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not).  NBER Working Paper, No. 7552.
Cole, S., 1978, Scientific reward systems: A comparative analysis. Research in Sociology of Knowledge,
Sciences and Art 1, 167–190.
Christensen, C., 1997, The innovator’s dilemma: When technologies cause great firms to fail (Harvard
University Press, Boston).
Dasgupta, P. and David, P., 1994, Toward a new economics of science”, Research Policy 23, 487–521.
Di Gregorio, D. and Shane, S., 2000, Why do some universities generate more start-ups than others?
Unpublished manuscript, Robert H. Smith School of Business (University of Maryland).
Diamond, A., 1986, What is a citation worth? Journal of Human Resources 21, 200–215.
Edquist, C., Eriksson, M.E. and Sjögren, H., 2000, Collaboration in product innovation in the East Gothia
regional system of innovation. Enterprise & Innovation Management Studies 1, 37–56.
Edquist, C. and Lundvall, B.–Å., 1993, Comparing the Danish and Swedish systems of innovation. In Nelson,
R.E. (Editor), National Innovation Systems – A Comparative Analysis (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
Eisenberg, R., 1996, Public research and private development: Patents and technology transfer in government
sponsored research. Virginia Law Review 82, 1663–1727.
Etzkowitz, H., Asplund, P. and Nordman, N., 2000, The university and regional renewal: Emergence of an
entrepreneurial paradigm in the US and Sweden. In Törnqvist, G. and Sörlin, S. (Editors), The Wealth of
Knowledge. Universities in the New Economy, forthcoming.
Feldman, M., Feller, I., Bercovitz, J. and Burton, R., 2001, Equity and the technology transfer strategies of
American research universities. Mimeo, March.33
Gelijns, A. and Rosenberg, N., 1999, Diagnostic devices: An analysis of comparative advantages, in Mowery, D.
and Nelson, R.E. (Editors), Sources of Industrial Leadership (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
Gittelman, M., 2002, The institutional origins of national innovation performance: Careers, organizations, and
patents in biotechnology in the United States and France. Unpublished manuscript, NYU, New York.
Goldfarb, B., 2001, The effect of government contracting on academic research. Discussion Paper No. 00-24.
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
Granstrand, O. and Alänge, S., 1995, The evolution of corporate entrepreneurship in Swedish industry – Was
Schumpeter wrong? Journal of Evolutionary Economics 5, 133–156.
Granstrand, O., Bohlin, E., Oskarsson, C. and Sjöberg, N., 1992, External technology acquisition in large multi-
technology corporations. R&D Management 22, 111–133.
Henderson, R., Jaffe, A. and Trajtenberg, M., 1998, Universities as a source of commercial technology: A
detailed analysis of university patenting, 1965–1988. Review of Economics and Statistics 80, 119–127.
Henrekson, M. and Jakobsson, U., 2001, Where Schumpeter was nearly right – The Swedish model and
capitalism, socialism and democracy. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 11, 331–358.
Henrekson, M. and Rosenberg, N., 2000, Incentives for academic entrepreneurship and economic performance:
Sweden and the United States. In Törnqvist, G. and Sörlin, S. (Editors), The Wealth of Knowledge.
Universities in the New Economy, forthcoming.
Henrekson, M. and Rosenberg, N., 2001, Designing efficient institutions for science-based entrepreneurship:
Lessons from the US and Sweden. Journal of Technology Transfer 26, 207–231.
Jacobsson, S., Sjöberg, C. and Wahlström, M., 2001, Alternative specifications of the institutional constraint to
economic growth – or why is there a shortage of computer and electronic engineers and scientists in Sweden?
Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 13, 179–193.
Jensen, R. and Thursby, M., 2001, Proofs and prototypes for sale: The tale of university licensing. American
Economic Review 91, 240–259.
Kenney, M., 1986, Biotechnology: The University-Industrial Complex (Yale University Press, New Haven and
London).
Lindholm Dahlstrand, Å., 1997a, Growth and inventiveness in technology-based spin-off firms. Research Policy
26, 331–344.
Lindholm Dahlstrand, Å., 1997b, Entrepreneurial spin-off enterprises in Göteborg, Sweden. European Planning
Studies 5, 659–673.
Mansfield, E., 1995, Academic research underlying industrial innovations: Source, characteristics, and financing.
The Review of Economics and Statistics 77, 55–65.
Monteverde, K. and Teece, D.J., 1982, Supplier switching costs and verticle integration in the automobile
industry. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 206–213.
Mowery, D., Nelson, R. Sampart, B. and Ziedonis, A., 2001, The growth of patenting and licensing by U.S.
universities: An assessment of the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Research Policy 30, 99–119.
National Science Board, 2000, Science and Engineering Indicators (USGPO, Washington DC).
Nelson, R.E. and Rosenberg, N., 1993, Technical innovation and national systems. Chapter 1 in Nelson, R.E.
(Editor), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, pp. 3–22 (Oxford University Press, New
York).
Noll, R. and Rogerson, W., 1998, The economics of university indirect cost reimbursement in Federal Research
Grants. In Noll, R. (Editor), Challenges to Research Universities (Brookings, Washington D.C.).
Olofsson, C. and Stymne, B., 1995, The contribution of new technology-based firms to the Swedish economy I:
A literature survey (IMIT Report 97:88, Stockholm and Göteborg).
Olofsson, C. and Wahlbin, C., 1993, Teknikbaserade företag från högskolan (Institute for Management of
Innovation and Technology, Stockholm).
Pavitt, K., 1984, Sectoral patterns of technical change: Towards a taxonomy and a theory. Research Policy 13,
343–73.34
Rickne, A. and Jacobsson, S., 1996, New technology-based firms – An exploratory study of technology
exploitation and industrial renewal. International Journal of Technology Management 11, 238–257.
Rickne, A. and Jacobsson, S., 1999, New technology-based firms in Sweden – A study of their direct impact on
industrial renewal. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 8, 197–223.
Rosenberg, N., 1982, How exogenous is science? In Inside the Black Box (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge).
Rosenberg, N., 1996, Uncertainty and technological change. In Landau, R., Taylor, T. and Wright, G. (Editors),
The Mosaic of Economic Growth, pp. 334–356 (Stanford University Press, Stanford).
Rosenberg, N., 2000, American universities as endogenous institutions. Ch. 3 in Schumpeter and the
Endogeneity of Technology: Some American Perspectives (Routledge, London).
Sandelin, J., 2001, Commercializing new technology: Current status and trends – An American perspective.
Presented at the Tao Pi Annual Conference, Athens, Greece, April.
Sandström, A., 2000, A Study of the Swedish Biotechnology Innovation System using Bibliometry (NUTEK,
Stockholm).
Sanstrom, A., Backlund, A., Hagglund,, H., Markusson, N., Nyberg, L. and Westerlund, L., 2001, The Swedish
Biotechnology Innovation System (Vinnova: The Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems, Stockholm).
Shane, Scott, 2001, Selling university technology: Patterns from MIT. Management Science, forthcoming.
Siegel, D., Waldman, D. and Link, A. N., 2002, Assessing the impact of organizational practices on the
productivity of university technology transfer offices: An exploratory study. Research Policy, forthcoming.
SOU 1996:70, Samverkan mellan högskolan och näringslivet. Huvudbetänkande av NYFOR (Fritzes,
Stockholm).
SOU 1998:128, Forskningspolitik. Slutbetänkande av Kommittén för översyn av den svenska
forskningspolitiken, Forskning 2000 (Fritzes, Stockholm).
Stankiewicz, R., 1986, Academics and entrepreneurs. Developing university-industry relations (Frances Pinter,
London).
Stern, S., 1999, Do scientists pay to be scientists? NBER Working Paper No. 7410.
Stokes, D., 1997, Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation (The Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C.).
Teece, D., 1986, Profiting from technological innovation. Research Policy 15, 285–306.
Thursby J. and Thursby, M., 2000, Who is selling the ivory tower? Sources of growth in university licensing.
Mimeo (Purdue University).
Uhlin, Å., Philips, Å. and Sundberg, L., 1992, Forskning och företagande. ERU-rapport No. 76
(Regeringskansliets offsetcentral, Stockholm).
Utterback, J. M. and Reitberger, G., 1982, Technology and industrial innovation in Sweden: A study of new-
technology based firms. Center for Policy Alternatives (MIT and STU, Stockholm).
Vedin, B.-A., 1993, Innovationer för Sverige. SOU 1993:84 (Näringsdepartementet, Stockholm).
Zucker, L., Darby, M. and Brewer, M., 1998, Intellectual human capital and the birth of US biotechnology
enterprises. American Economic Review 88, 290–306.